Home alone: Europeans are ready to defend themselves – European Council on Foreign Relations

Summary Amid geopolitical turmoil, Europeans are taking nuanced and realistic positions that demand tough choices from their leaders. A major new ECFR poll shows Europeans embrace self-reliance and are clear-eyed about Donald Trump—but do not expect a permanent break from the US. They back Ukraine—but are anxious about bringing it into the European Union now or sending troops there. They know they face an energy crisis—but remain solidly opposed to Russian fossil-fuel imports. Leaders therefore have the public’s backing to pursue strategic autonomy without posturing, to seek out new mechanisms for supporting Ukraine, and to push ahead on energy sovereignty.

The art of the possible

Like little Kevin in the classic comedy film, European citizens have woken up to an uncomfortable truth: they have been left Home Alone. Not by their parents and siblings, but by an America on whom many thought they could depend.

Left to fend for himself, Kevin has to be starkly realist and challenge some old assumptions. He booby-traps the house, protect himself and it, and learns self-reliance in the process. Europeans too are finding the experience of being Home Alone is breaking some old taboos and ways of thinking. They are willing to go much farther than before to defend themselves despite being optimistic that the US will “come home” to the transatlantic alliance eventually. They prioritise domestic security and are wary of exposing themselves to a direct fight in the EU’s neighbourhood. Like Kevin they are embracing their self-sufficiency; resisting the temptation of new Russian fossil fuel imports even as energy prices rise.

In other words, like Macaulay Culkin’s character in the film, they have become more “grown up”. Their leaders will have to reckon with this new reality fast—it both opens up political space but also entreats them to act on the harsh realities of the moment.

Europeans’ new-found realism manifests itself in three notable areas:

First, European trust in the US has crashed to new lows. Europeans do not expect America under Donald Trump to protect them, and they recognise the need for more autonomous security (even funded by common debt).

But they do think the relationship will likely improve after Trump and want to leave the door open to that possibility.

Second, although they continue to back Ukraine, Europeans do not believe the EU’s eastward enlargement would be a good idea in the current context. They are also reluctant to send their own troops to keep the peace in a post-war Ukraine.

Third, Europeans have learned the lessons of depending on Russian oil and gas. Even as a new energy crunch bears down on living standards, they are resolute in opposing purchases of fossil fuels from Russia—with majorities across the continent for prioritising European renewable energy.

These are the main results of a major public opinion poll, totalling 19,481 respondents, commissioned by ECFR and conducted in May 2026 in 15 European countries: Austria, Bulgaria, Denmark, Estonia, France, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and the UK. It finds Europe’s publics internalising the geopolitical shifts of recent years, recognising the finite limits of the continent’s current power to change them, but also supporting bold and pragmatic action.

Within that popular realism, however, dwells a challenge to Europe’s leaders: to adapt to voters’ sense of the possible and, with several major European elections looming in 2027, to use its opportunities while they can.

Booby-trapping the house

In Home Alone, Kevin realises that the house is undefended and threatened by intruders, but he still hopes and even expects his family will come back eventually. European public opinion today exhibits a similar outlook.

A dawning realisation

ECFR’s poll confirms the collapse in European faith in the US. Only 11% of respondents now consider it an ally, down from 16% half a year ago and 22% in November 2024. Meanwhile fully 25% see it as either a rival or an adversary. In most countries, the decline has been steady, except for Poland and Hungary where it is a newer phenomenon. Across the states polled, supporters of only two right-populist political parties—Law and Justice (PiS) in Poland and Reform UK—continue to view America primarily as an ally. Trump’s US is now losing the trust of all but its most faithful European comrades.

Fully half the European public now see the US as not an ally but a “necessary partner”. A growing number, especially in Denmark, France, Spain and Switzerland, see it as a rival or even an adversary. This outlook is pronounced among the voters of some western European progressive parties, such as Spain’s Socialists (PSOE). But it is still far from majoritarian across the continent. Pedro Sánchez’s defiant stance against Trump does not (yet) reflect average European opinion.

This shift comes after Trump threatened to annex Greenland; attacked Iran without a plan then demanded Europeans resolve the resulting problems; pressured Kyiv without delivering a Ukraine-Russia peace; dismissed US commitments to NATO and announced withdrawals of some US troops from Europe.

Little surprise, then, that majorities in every European country polled think that the US would not support them if they came under attack—whereas they do trust their European neighbours to do so. Again, PiS and Reform are the stand-out parties whose supporters still have faith in the US, followed by those of Giorgia Meloni’s Brothers of Italy (FdI), who are evenly split on this point.

Meanwhile, majorities in almost every country polled except Bulgaria say they are confident that “at least some European countries” would come to their aid if their country were attacked. Strikingly, this neighbourly optimism extends far beyond Europhile usual suspects; even supporters of the National Rally (RN) in France, Giorgia Meloni’s Brothers of Italy, the Party for Freedom in the Netherlands and the Sweden Democrats vest their hopes in fellow Europeans.

Yet the broad European distrust towards the US does not translate into majoritarian support for replacing NATO with a Europe-only defence organisation. Only 29% of respondents think this would be a good idea—and about as many (28%) oppose it. Most people do not take a firm view on this issue, which means that the balance could still be swayed in one direction or another if this eventually becomes a topical matter.

Homemade defence

A vulnerable house needs good defences. Europeans broadly get this. They generally favour higher defence spending, an independent European nuclear deterrent, and a more “buy European” approach to defence procurement (even if Germans and Italians are finely balanced on this latter point). Italians stand out among citizens of major European states in their opposition to several of these positions, especially the spending increases.

Most Europeans also want to reduce their security dependence on the US. Only in Poland do most voters consider it a good idea to buy more American weapons.

Europeans are also ready to revisit their views on how to pay for their greater security autonomy, even if that means taking on common debt to fund the investments. Predictably, supporters of radical-right parties tend to oppose this position—or are divided over the matter. But most other voters back it, including in some countries traditionally sceptical about European fiscal integration. Asked whether they support joining other European countries in taking on common debt for defence spending, even voters for the governing parties in steely Austria, Denmark, Germany, the Netherlands and Sweden are mostly in favour.

Admittedly, when forced to choose between defence and other public-spending needs, Europeans are more ambivalent. A plurality oppose choosing defence; including majorities in Germany, Italy and Spain. But that trade-off would be acceptable to most people in Estonia, France, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal and the UK.

Overall, the direction is clear. Between ECFR’s last European poll in November 2025 and this new one in May 2026, publics in most states (most notably in Spain) have shifted in favour of increased defence spending. In some places there is also new openness to a European nuclear deterrent; with Danes and Italians warming to the idea and Brits, once firmly opposed to sharing their nuclear arsenal, now evenly split on the issue.

Hoping for a return

Kevin might be home alone (initially happily so), but he ends up hoping that his family will come back.

This reflects the European outlook: citizens know that they must do more for their own security, but still expect a return to normal transatlantic relations after Trump. Most believe that the transatlantic relationship will “probably get better” once Trump’s presidency is over. On that point, there has been barely any change since a year ago, when ECFR asked the same question. Notably, even supporters of Spain’s governing PSOE, whose opposition to Trumpian policy has distinguished Spanish diplomacy in recent months, mostly (68%) think transatlantic relations will improve.

Not going out (for now)

Europeans continue to support Ukraine in its self-defence against Russia: majorities in most countries see Ukraine either as an ally or a necessary partner with which Europeans should strategically cooperate.

On this point, perceptions of the country are more positive than those of America almost everywhere (except for Poland and Hungary, which both have thorny bilateral relations with Kyiv).

And yet for European citizens, this favourable view does not imply a military commitment to Ukraine. Their prevailing stance is to oppose sending troops there after any peace. This view commends a majority in Germany, France and Poland, three of the EU’s keystone defence powers.

Even more importantly, today, there is no public consensus to bring Ukraine into the EU “in the current context”, including among Ukraine’s geographically closest neighbours. This is not about people’s rejection of enlargement as such—because views are much more sympathetic to the EU’s westward expansion (for example, by having the UK rejoin).

Meanwhile, eastward enlargement elicits strong opposition in Austria, Bulgaria and Hungary. Opinion is more finely balanced in Estonia, France, Germany and Poland. Surprisingly, in the usually enlargement-sceptic Netherlands, the public leans (slightly) towards supporting the EU’s eastward enlargement.

That said, in all countries many voters simply decline to position themselves decisively on the issue. Therein lies room to change opinions—in one direction or the other.

Taken together, this shows the limits of the two main frameworks in which European leaders are currently viewing Ukraine: that of enlargement and that of a potential peacekeeping mission after the war. Both currently lack broad public support across Europe.

Worryingly, European populists are espousing more assertively anti-Ukrainian views. Viktor Orban focused his unsuccessful election campaign to remain Hungarian prime minister on that theme. Meanwhile ECFR’s polling shows that voters of the far-right Freedom Party in Austria (FPÖ), the AfD in Germany, two far-right parties in Poland, and the governing and populist Progressive Bulgaria all see Ukraine as chiefly a “rival” or “adversary”.

Things could therefore still get worse. And these feelings might be further weaponised during electoral campaigns; especially if they are coupled with the sense of a “forever war” in Ukraine, anxieties about Ukraine’s EU accession, or an imagined link between that war and people’s growing cost-of-living worries.

Unless addressed with more creativity, these trends may create a headache for the bilateral EU-Ukraine partnership in the near future.